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ABSTRACT
Firefox Add-on for Metamorphic JavaScript Malware Detection
by Sravan Kumar Reddy Javaji
With the increasing use of the Internet, malicious software has more
frequently been designed to take control of users computers for illicit purposes.
Cybercriminals are putting a lot of efforts to make malware difficult to detect. In
this study, we demonstrate how the metamorphic JavaScript malware can effect a
victim’s machine using a malicious or compromised Firefox add-on. Following the
same methodology, we develop another add-on with malware static detection
technique to detect metamorphic JavaScript malware.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The arrival of the Internet has completely revolutionized our personal and
professional lives. With the rapid growth of the Internet, all the market sectors,
social networking services, advertising and non-commerical sectors are using this
technology in their workflow. As we become more dependent on the online
environment, we can see massive growth of opportunities for IT criminals to take
advantage of user systems.
Internet users often share sensitive information like bank account details or
other personal information, over the network. As personal computers and mobile
phones became an important part in most people‘s lives, these computers became a
hub of user‘s personal information. In this world of ubiquitous computers and
persistent threats from hackers, protecting your computer is a must. Several
websites are hacked to be used as distributors of malware, to infect the visitors
unknowingly with viruses and malware. A single visit to a such a hacked web page
is sufficient for an intruder to get control of a user‘s machine.
In late 2013, one of the bank‘s internal computers that are used by employees
to process and record daily transactions, had been infected with malware [7]. The
malware continuously monitored the bank‘s activities for several months, sending
back images and video feeds to cybercriminals about the bank‘s daily routines.
Then the cybercriminals impersonated bank officers, turned on several cash
machines and also transferred millions of dollars from banks into dummy accounts
of other countries.
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Consider the fact that more than 6,600 benign websites are getting hacked
every single day [6]. These legitimate websites are turned into distributors of
malware by malicious hackers. Malicious code can be injected into legitimate
Javascript of a benign web page. When a user visits such a compromised website,
this malicious JavaScript will be executed in the victim‘s web browser. Execution of
such malicious JavaScript can infect the victim‘s personal computer. Most of the
times, malicious JavaScript redirects the victim‘s web browser to load more
malicious code from a remote server. This can be achieved through several means,
such as adding an HTML iframe element to a page. Always cybercriminals try to
obfuscate the malicious content from detection. HTML provides very few ways to
obfuscate the code such as adding an HTML iframe element to a page but the huge
number of methods in JavaScript makes it easy to heavily obfuscate the malicious
code into Javascript.
1.1 Problem
Malware is malicious software, specifically designed to gain access to the data
or to damage the resources without the knowledge of victim [4]. Researchers
developed various techniques for malware detection like signature based detection
and heuristic analysis. To overcome the malware detection techniques, malware
writers came up with different types of malwares among which metamorphic
malware is an advanced version. Metamorphic malware is capable of changing its
internal structure without altering its functionality from infection to infection. Due
to the metamorphic nature, such malware is very difficult to detect. With a huge set
of functions, JavaScript makes it possible for virus writers to develop malicious
JavaScript code with metamorphic feature. Transcriptase is such a case, which is
2
1 //sample.js
2 <script>
3 var x = 5;
4 var y = 6;
5 var z = x + y;
6 </script>
1 //sample_morphed.js - obfuscated version of sample.js
2 <script>
3 var y_renamed = 6;
4 var x_renamed = 5;
5 var z_renamed = x_renamed + y_renamed;
6 </script>
Figure 1: JavaScript Sample and its obfuscated version.
designed to infect other JavaScript files in the same folder [5].
1.2 Proposed Solution
In spite of the fact that malware can change their internal structure the
priority order of the important commands cannot be changed. Case in point,
consider a sample JavaScript code below,
From the code in Figure 1, it is clear that even though the variable names are
changed and the order of declaration of 𝑥 and 𝑦 (or 𝑥_𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑑 and 𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑑)
are changed, the arithmetic operation always follows the declaration of those two
variables else the code may give syntactical errors or the wrong result.
So, we can make use of the opcodes statistical information to detect the
malware.
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1.3 A Browser Plugin for Detecting Malware
Generally JavaScript malware will be injected into benign web pages. When a
user visits this infected website, the malicious JavaScript code will be executed in
the browser. To prevent this, we can develop an add-on which will monitor the
JavaScript content of every web page and the browser can disable the JavaScript
execution before the page gets loaded. The add-on will analyze the JavaScript in
the background and will enable the JavaScript load, if the web page is found to be
benign or else warn the user about malicious content without loading the JavaScript.
This procedure can secure the victim‘s computer from malware infection. For this
research, we can use the Transcriptase metamorphic JavaScript malware.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide
background information on metamorphic malware and with an emphasis on
Transcriptase metamorphic JavaScript malware that forms the basis for the
research. Also in this chapter, we cover the Rhino Javascript engine. Chapter 3
outlines the details of Firefox add-on development. Then in Chapter 4, we discuss
two different static metamorphic detection techniques that we apply to detect the
metamorphic JavaScript malware. In Chapter 5, we present the accuracy and
performance details of Firefox add-on using opcode similarity detection technique.
Our experimental results for the original metamorphic JavaScript appear. Chapter
6 contains the conclusion and consideration for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
Malware is a software program intended to do pernicious activities on a
client‘s computer with the proposition of removing data and misusing assets without
his assent. Viruses and worms are the best known types of malware on account of
the way in which they spread, instead of their behavior. Malware is now and then
utilized widely against government or corporate websites to gather protected data or
to disturb their operations by large. Also, malware is regularly utilized against
people to steal data, for example, personal identification numbers or bank or credit
card details and passwords. As per a survey on data breaches led by Verizon in 2014
[9], Citadel is the preferred banking malware among attackers for stealing individual
information. And for stealing money from bank accounts, Zeus is the favorite
banking malware.
Figure 1 shows how the malware is swiftly growing in volume day-by-day. In
Figure 1, the x-axis specifies the year and the y-axis indicates the number of
malware samples generated in the specified year on the x-axis.
Virus writers are aware that signature-based detection with heuristic analysis
can be the basis of modern malware detection techniques. So, virus developers have
created numerous procedures and techniques to evade signature-based detection. In
January 2015, AV-TEST‘s CEO said, "Many of the new malware samples are just
variants of existing viruses. They have been modified so that they are no longer
detected and thus, AV signature updates are required" [10]. Some of the noteworthy
techniques used by virus writers to evade signature detection are encryption,
5
Figure 2: Annual Malware Growth [10]
polymorphism and metamorphism.
2.1 Encrypted Malware
The Cascade virus, which initially appeared in late 1986, was the first
malware that used encryption to scramble its contents [11]. The Cascade virus is
comprised of two parts. The first part is a decryptor and the second part is
encrypted malware code. The reason for encryption is to conceal the malware
signature, so as to evade signature identification. Later, this technique was adopted
by almost every encrypted malware. For the most part, virus writers use extremely
simple and weak encryption methods, for example, a repeated XOR with a fixed bit
pattern. Cascade malware also used XOR operation as encryption routine because
of its symmetrical and reversible feature. In the event that the encryption key of
malware was changed after every infection, the encrypted body signature also gets
changed. If in case the same decryptor was used, signature detection can make use
of the decryptor code‘s signature to detect the malware.
6
Figure 3: An Encrypting malware spreads without changing decryptor but the key
within decryptor varies from infection to infection. As the key value changes, the
encrypted virus body also changes [14].
2.2 Polymorphic Malware
Similar to an encrypted malware, polymorphic malware incorporates an
encrypted virus code and a decryptor. Additionally in a polymorphic virus, the
decryptor is morphed. During polymorphic malware propogation, not only is the
virus code encrypted, but the decryptor also varies from infection to infection. As
there is no fixed signature or no fixed decryptor to scan for, no two infections look
alike to be exploited by the antivirus program for detection purpose [14].
Polymorphic virus uses code obfuscation techniques, for example, including junk
codes or substitution of instructions, to mutate its decryptor [18]. Several
techniques are utilized to decrypt the polymorphic virus, such as, cryptanalysis
(also called x-ray), emulation and dedicated decryption routines [21].
The first polymorphic malware, 1260, was developed by Mark Washburn in
1990 [15]. And the first widespread polymorphic infection was caused by Tequila
and Maltese Amoeba virus, in 1991 [14].
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1 MOV A,R1 MOV A,R1 MOV A,R1 MOV A,R1 MOV A,R1
2 ADD B,R1 NOP ADD #0,R1 OR R1,R1 TST R1
3 ADD C,R1 ADD B,R1 ADD B,R1 ADD B,R1 ADD C,R1
4 SUB #4,R1 NOP OR R1,R1 MOV R1,R5 MOV R1,R5
5 MOV R1,X ADD C,R1 ADD C,R1 ADD C,R1 ADD B,R1
6 NOP SHL #0,R1 SHL R1,0 CMP R2,R5
7 SUB #4,R1 SUB #4,R1 SUB #4,R1 SUB #4,R1
8 NOP JMP .+1 ADD R5,R5 JMP .+1
9 MOV R1,X MOV R1,X MOV R1,X MOV R1,X
10 MOV R5,Y MOV R5,Y
11 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Figure 4: Examples of a polymorphic virus utilizing code obfuscation techniques. All
of the Figure 4 snippets perform the same operation, i.e., 𝑋 = (𝐴+𝐵 +𝐶 − 4). For
instance, the program snippet of Figure 4 (c) is functionally the same as Figure 4 (a)
in light of the fact that instructions like adding 0 to a register, ORing R1 with itself,
shifting R1 left 0 bits, and jumping to the next instruction all do nothing [19].
2.3 Metamorphic Malware
Virus writers took the next step and developed an advanced variant of
polymorphic malware, known as metamorphic malware. Generally, before infection,
polymorphic malware encrypt the virus code and morph the decryptor, while
metamorphic malware morph the whole virus code. According to Igor Muttik,
"Metamorphics are bodypolymorphics", since polymorphism is applied to the entire
virus body [22]. Metamorphic viruses utilizes several code morphing techniques that
constitute instruction reordering, data reordering, subroutine inlining, subroutine
outlining, register renaming, instruction substitution and dead code insertion [23].
Figure 5 illustrates the metamorphic malware with different signatures.
2.3.1 Register renaming
In December 1998, a metamorphic malware named Win95/Regswap was
developed by Vecna [22]. Regswap used register renaming technique to morph the
8
Figure 5: Metamorphic malware with different signatures [20].
Figure 6: code snippet extracted from two different versions of RegSwap [22].
virus code. In this technique, instructions gets modified to use different registers.
As just the register operands gets altered that too in some part of the code instead
of whole code, so the complexity of final modified code wouldn‘t be high. Figure 6
depicts how the register renaming technique transforms the code.
The bold areas in figure 6 illustrates the similarities of the two different code
versions. Thus, a wildcard string, such as 5?𝐵?, could be useful to detect the
9
1 C7060F000055 MOV [esi], 5500000Fh
2 C746048BEC5151 MOV [esi+0004], 5151EC8Bh
3 BF0F00055 MOV edi, 5500000Fh
4 893E MOV [esi], edi
5 5F POP edi ; garbage
6 52 PUSH edx ; garbage
7 B640 MOV dh, 40 ; garbage
8 BA8BEC5151 MOV edx, 5151EC8Bh
9 53 PUSH ebx ; garbage
10 8BDA MOV ebx, edx
11 895E04 MOV [esi+0004], ebx
Figure 7: Example of code metamorphosis of Evol virus with Dead code insertion
[23].
malware code [22].
2.3.2 Dead code insertion
Dead code can be a single instruction or a block of instructions, for example,
adding NOPs [23], adding 0 to a register, moving between same registers, ORing
register with itself, shifting register left 0 bits, jumping to next instruction,
incrementing a register immediately followed by decrementing the same register by
same value. Inserting dead code or do-nothing instructions is the easiest approach
to morph the virus code without modifying its functionality [23]. The Win32/Evol
virus, which was found around July 2000 [24], used dead code insertion to obfuscate
the signature of a code as illustrated in Figure 7.
2.3.3 Subroutine permutation
Code may contain several subroutines (or) functions and changing the order of
this subroutines may not impact the execution of code. Subroutine permutation
approach makes use of this advantage i.e., altering the order of subroutines, to
10
Figure 8: Example of subroutines permutation [23].
change its internal structure without modifying the functionality of code. A code
with 𝑛 different subroutines can generate 𝑛! different permutations of subroutines,
thus large number of versions of the same code can be generated [4].
2.3.4 Equivalent code substitution
Different variants of code can be generated by replacing instruction or block of
instructions with an equivalent code. In assembly language there are numerous
semantically equivalent instructions, for instance, ‘INC ecx’ is same as ‘ADD ecx, 1’,
‘XOR R1, R1’ is same as ‘MOV R1, 0’ [25].
2.3.5 Transposition
Morphed copies of virus code can also be created by changing the order of
instructions in the code provided that there is no dependency among instructions,
so this approach is also known as instruction permutation [23]. For instance, the
code in figure 9 can be transformed to figure 10, as the declaration order of variables
doesn‘t affect the arithmetic calculation [4].
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1 int a=5;
2 int b=2;
3 int c=a+b;
Figure 9: Sample Java code [4].
1 int b=2;
2 int a=5;
3 int c=a+b;
Figure 10: Sample Java code after swapping instructions [4].
2.3.6 Changing control flow
The next code obfuscation method involves insertion of a conditional or
unconditional branch instruction after a block of instructions. Further, instruction
blocks referenced by this branching instructions can be permuted to change the
control flow [23]. Zperm malware used this approach to change the internal
structure of a code [25]. Figure 11 is an example of changing control flow.
2.3.7 Subroutine inlining and outlining
In subroutine inlining procedure, subroutine/function call replaces its code
[23]. Figure 12 illustrates the concept of Subroutine inlining.
On the other hand, code outlining changes a block of instructions into
subroutine (or function) and a subroutine call will be included for the newly created
subroutine. Figure 13 illustrates how the code outlining approach works.
2.4 Transcriptase
Transcriptase is a metamorphic virus implemented in JavaScript. Whenever
Transcriptase is executed, a morphed version of the malware virus gets prepended
12
1 ;Original Program
2 instruction 1 ; entry point
3 instruction 2
4 instruction 3
5 instruction 4
6 instruction 5
1 ;Modified Program
2 instruction 2
3 jump 3
4 instruction 4
5 jump 5
6 instruction 1 ; entry point
7 jump 2
8 instruction 3
9 jump 4
10 instruction 5
Figure 11: Example of changing control flow [25].
1 /* some instrictions */ /* some instrictions */
2 call S1 mov eax, ebx
3 call S2 add eax, 12h
4 /* some instrictions */ push eax
5 S1: mul ecx
6 mov eax, ebx mov edx, eax
7 add eax, 12h /* some instrictions */
8 push eax
9 ret
10 S2:
11 mul ecx
12 mov edx, eax
13 ret
14 (a) before transformation (b) after transformation
Figure 12: Subroutine inlining example [25].
to all the JavaScript files in the folder [4]. The infected JavaScript file will become
the variant of Transcriptase. By this way Transcriptase propagates and infects the
benign JavaScript files.
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1 /* some instrictions */ /* some instrictions */
2 mov eax, ebx mov eax, ebx
3 add eax, 12h call S1
4 push eax mov edx, eax
5 mul ecx /* some instrictions */
6 mov edx, eax S1:
7 /* some instrictions */ push eax
8 add eax, 12h
9 mul ecx
10 ret
11 (a) before transformation (b) after transformation
Figure 13: Subroutine outlining example [25].
The metamorphic engine attached to Transcriptase is a self-hosted compiler,
which contains its own meta-language source-code. Transcriptase obtains
information of its code from meta-language and changes its internal structure.
The format of every line of the meta-code looks like [26]:
(Identifier|Restrictions)instruction
For instance, below are sample meta-instructions:
(200|)var b=0
(300|200)c+1(b)
An Identifier and Restrictions are used by the Permutation function to do
code obfuscation. The identifier is unique for every instruction in the entire code
and restrictions specify the instructions on which the corresponding instruction is
depending. The "instruction" contains the details used to create an actual code.
The compiler creates the new malicious JavaScript code with three steps:
1. Permutation and Variable/Function-Name randomization
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1 (100|)var a=5
2 (200|)var b=-1
3 (300|)var x=8
4 (400|200)c+1(b) // instruction c+1(b) means increment b by 1: i.e. b++
5 (500|400,100)c+n(b,a) // instruction c+n(b,a) means increment b by a:
i.e. b+=a
6 (600|500)xWScript.Echo(x)
Figure 14: Meta-language instructions example [4].
2. Code Creation
3. Variable/Function insertion
2.4.1 Permutator
In this phase, the compiler parses through every meta-language instruction,
scope by scope (global scope for global instructions and sub-scope for
if/for/while/functions) and retrieves the identifiers and restrictions details for each
meta-instruction. Later these identifier and restriction details are used by the
compiler to perform the permutation of code.
If the restriction details are empty for all the meta-language instructions, then
it specifies that all the instructions in the code do not have any dependency
instructions. So, the entire code can be permuted in all the possible combinations.
For instance, if there are 𝑛 lines of code, then the permutator can create 𝑛!
variations of the original code.
For instance, consider the code specified in Figure 14 [4]. It contains
restriction details for some of the meta-instructions, which means that those
instructions have dependencies on other instructions. So all the combinations of the
code cannot produce the correct behaviour.
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1 (200|)var b=-1
2 (400|200)c+1(b)
3 (100|)var a=5
4 (500|400,100)c+n(b,a) // instruction c+n(b,a) means increment b by a:
i.e. b+=a
5 (300|)var x=8
6 (600|500)xWScript.Echo(x)
Figure 15: Possible output of the permutator after parsing the code in Figure 14 [4].
From the code in Figure 14, instruction 400 depends on instruction 200,
because the variable "b" has to be defined before it can be incremented; instruction
500 depends on both the instructions 400 and 100; and instruction 600 depends on
instruction 300. Figure 15 contains the code, which could be one of the possible
output generated by the permutator [4]:
As the growth-rate of the permutation function is very fast, even for the large
number of instruction this technique works effectively [26].
2.4.2 Variable/Function-Name randomization
In this step, the keywords like "var", "while", "for", and "def" are searched
initially in the code by the compiler and the details of existing hard-coded names in
those instructions are retrieved. In other words, the details of all the variable names
and function names are gathered by the compiler. These names are replaced with
random names by the compiler and also all the valid occurrences of these
hard-coded names in the current scope are replaced.
For instance, consider the code in Figure 16. First, the compiler searches for
the "var", "function", and "def" keywords and the hard-coded names - num,
multiply, inputparam, and twiceval are retrieved. Then it replaces these hard-coded
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1 var num=20;
2 function multiply(inputparam)
3 {
4 return 2 * inputparam;
5 }
6 def twiceval=multiply(num)
Figure 16: Before Variable/Function-Name randomization [26].
1 var ljkjuytbenst=20;
2 function trqwsdexcv(awsrsfagfqwxczv)
3 {
4 return 2 * awsrsfagfqwxczv;
5 }
6 def bxswdqtyzyqtc=trqwsdexcv(ljkjuytbenst)
Figure 17: After randomly changing the Variables/Function-Names of the code in
Figure 16 [26].
names with some random names like "ljkjuytbenst" or "awsrsfagfqwxczv". The
compiler also replaces all occurrences of the hard-coded names, for example, there
are two instances of "inputparam" present in the function, both these names are
replaced with the random name. One of the possible changes to the code during this
phase is shown in Figure 17.
2.4.3 Meta-Language Symbols
After rearrangement of the instructions and hard-coded names replacement,
the compiler generates a valid JavaScript code by parsing through every
meta-instruction. These meta-instructions contain meta-level symbols and each of
these symbols has specific meaning like number, element, object etc. While parsing
meta-instructions, compiler processes these meta-level symbols.
For example, consider the code in Figure 18. Here meta-symbol #n...n#
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1 var number=#n1n#
2 var str=#"Hello VXers"#
3 var exp=#x1true1x#
4 x#O1WScript#.Echo(°+str+°)1O#
Figure 18: Meta-Language Symbols Example [26].
x#O1WScript#.Echo(°+str+°)1O#
could become
function SomeFunction(SomeArg){WScript.Echo(SomeArg);}
SomeFunction(str)
Figure 19: Meta-Language Symbols processing Example [26].
specifies any value present in between #n’s (i.e., in place of ...) specifies Number,
meta-symbol #"..."# specifies any value present in the place of dots (or ...)
specifies string, any value in #xN...Nx# specifies elements, the values between
#01... #. ...10# specifies Objects and the symbol "°+ ... +°" specifies that the
variable inside must be given as an argument for a function, if the instruction is
derived into a function [26].
Figure 19 illustrates how the meta-symbols with objects are processed.
2.4.4 Code Derivation
After processing all the meta-language symbols, the compiler generates
JavaScript code by parsing the meta-language instructions. During this phase,
compiler deals with some more meta-instructions that have specific properties as
mentioned below [26]:
while(initial$var1!var2?operator@action)NNN
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1. "initial" specifies the code that is to be executed before the while loop
like variable declaration
2. "var1" and "var2" along with the "operator" specifies the while loop
condition.
3. "action" specifies the end of the loop instruction like counter increment.
4. "NNN" specifies total number of lines in the loop
cO(1||n||s)
This specifies general way of representing number/string arithmetic
instruction. "O" specifies operator like +, -, *, /. Below are some of the
meta-instructions that follow this format,
1. c+1(var1): increment var1 by 1
2. c+n(var1,var2): increment var1 by the number var2
3. c+s(var1,var2): concatenate var1 with the string var2
4. c-1(var1): decrement var1 by 1
5. c-n(var1,var2): decrement var1 by the number var2
6. c*1(var1): multiply var1 by 1
7. c*n(var1,var2): multiply var1 by the number var2
8. c/1(var1): divide var1 by 1
9. c/n(var1,var2): divide var1 by the number var2
2.4.5 Variable/Function insertion
Several variables and functions are defined during the compilation phase
because of meta-instructions and obfuscation. These variables are saved in special
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arrays instead of being stored in the code. At the end of code derivation phase, they
are placed into the code .
Functions can be included between instructions in the global scope. Variables
can be included between instructions in the current scope, before they are used for
the first time [4]. This phase takes lot of time to complete, as the whole code is
checked for multiple times to find suitable positions for the variable/function
insertions [26].
2.5 Rhino
During 1997, Netscape began working on developing a variant of Netscape
Navigator written in Java [27]. In order to implement the navigator in Java, they
built a JavaScript engine entirely in Java, named Rhino. Rhino is open source
software and is currently maintained by Mozilla.
Most of the time, JavaScript is utilized as a part of HTML for making
interactive webpages. Anyhow, Rhino is not used to create or manipulate webpages;
it is an implementation of the core JavaScript. Rhino has the below aspects [27]:
1. Supports JavaScript 1.7 features
2. Allows direct scripting of Java
3. The Rhino Shell can execute the JavaScript code interactively or in batch
mode
4. The JavaScript Compiler can compile the JavaScript code into Java classes
5. The JavaScript Debugger for debugging scripts in Rhino
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Figure 20: Block Diagram of Rhino Engine [29].
In this research, we use Rhino to translate the JavaScript code into Java
classes. The engine supports both compile mode and interpretive mode. During
compile mode, the engine first translates each JavaScript file to separate Java class
files. These .class files may be executed as Java programs using Rhino runtime
support routines. During interpretive mode, JavaScript is compiled and is stored as
internal representation of the compiled form instead of byte codes. During runtime
this compiled form is evaluated using rhino functions.
2.5.1 Architecture
The four basic blocks in the Rhino JavaScript engine are - the parser, the
byte-code generator, the interpreter and the JIT [4]. Figure 20 depicts the block
diagram of the Rhino Engine [29].
Parser: The input for this module is JavaScript code and the output
generated is the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST). The AST is a tree representation of
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1 function gcd(a, b)
2 {
3 while (b != 0)
4 {
5 if a > b
6 a -= b
7 else
8 b -= a
9 }
10 return a
11 }
Figure 21: Euclid’s GCD algorithm.
the abstract syntactic structure of a program. For instance, Figure 21 represents the
AST for the GCD code in Figure 22 [30].
The non-leaf nodes in the AST specify the operations to be performed, for
instance, equal, comparison, arithmetic operation and so on. The leaf nodes in AST
specify operands in the source code, for instance, a and b variables [4].
Byte-Code Generator: The AST output generated from the parser acts as
input to the Byte-Code Generator which then converts the tree into byte code.
During the conversion process, the Byte-Code generator picks each code block in the
tree and translates it into bytecode. For instance, the byte code for the instruction
𝑐 = 𝑎− 𝑏 is shown in Figure 23 [4].
The bytecode in Figure can be interpreted as -
1. Load the values that are stored at offset 1 and offset 2 into registers
2. Subtract these loaded values
3. Store the result at offset 3.
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Figure 22: Abstract Syntax Tree for the GCD code in Figure 21 [30].
1 iload_1
2 iload_2
3 isub 3
4 istore_3
Figure 23: Sample byte code for the instruction 𝑐 = 𝑎− 𝑏 [4].
Interpreter: The input for the interpreter is the byte code output of the
Byte-Code Generator. The byte code is then converted into machine level code
using the Just-in-time (JIT) compiler. During runtime, this generated machine code
gets executed. When the byte code in Figure 23 is given as input to the Interpreter,
it generates the machine code as shown in Figure 24.
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1 MOV EAX 0xFF20
2 MOV EBX 0xFF24
3 SUB EAX EBX
4 MOV ECX EAX
Figure 24: Sample Machine Code generated for the byte code in Figure 23 [4].
2.5.2 Modification
For this research, we need the opcodes of JavaScript code, so we used the
version of Rhino that was modified by the author of [4].
Below changes were made in the modified version [4]:
1. The page load time is directly proportional to compiling time of JavaScript, so
Rhino was optimized to convert only small part of JavaScript files. Because of
this optimization, the original statistics of the JavaScript code that will be
used as part of analysis will get affected. In order to solve this problem the
engine was modified to compile JavaScript of any length.
2. Different optimization techniques were used to optimize class files for speed
execution. As these optimization techniques also affect the statistics of
JavaScript code, they were disabled.
3. Generally opcodes are generated by decompiling the class files. This method
consumes a lot of time as this process require the generation of class file and
again decompilation of these class files. As the class files generated are of no
use, the opcodes are extracted from the code during compilation itself. By
following this approach, the time used for decompilation of class files is saved.
4. As the opcodes are extracted before the class file is created, this modification
also solved the problem associated with class files optimization.
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Figure 25: JavaScript compilation with Rhino.
5. The opcodes are tapped and redirected to the standard output. Thus all the
opcodes are printed on the screen. This output can also be saved in a file
using the unix redirect operator (>).
The below command is used to run the Rhino engine:
java -cp <path_to_rhino_js.jar> org.mozilla.javascript.tools.jsc.Main
<JavaScript_File_Path>
Figures 25 and 26 are the screenshots of compiling JavaScript code with the original
version and the modified version of Rhino respectively.
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Figure 26: JavaScript compilation with modified version of Rhino.
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CHAPTER 3
Firefox Add-on Development
An add-on is a piece of software that augments another application. Based on
the browser, different terms are used to refer to this software, like add-on, plug-in,
or extension. An add-on cannot be executed as stand-alone software. Add-ons are
used for different purposes like blocking advertisements and popups, downloading
videos, and also to integrate several social network sites.
Below are some of the applications of add-ons
1. An add-on can change the browser interface, which includes changing themes,
the look and feel of buttons, the menu bar, and tabs.
2. They are also capable of adding new features to the browser, like providing
easy usage of various softwares in the form of toolbars.
3. Add-ons can also modify the behavior of browsers, like customizing the search
option or page redirection.
4. Add-ons used as plug-ins let the browser support internet content. These
include Flash, Silverlight, and music players like QuickTime, real player,
online games, and many more.
5. On many browsers, online privacy is protected using add-ons. There are many
types of add-ons that help to control and secure browsing and avoid attacks
like preventing the user movements tracking on the browser.
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Browser Extensions are supported by Microsoft Internet Explorer starting
with version 5 released in 1999. From 2004, Mozilla Firefox supports add-ons. The
Opera browser supports extensions starting with the desktop version 10 which was
released in 2009. Google Chrome and Safari added support for extensions in 2010.
Each browser has different variations in the browser extension syntax and they are
compatible to their browser alone i.e., an extension built for one browser doesn‘t
work on another. For using search engine tools irrespective of browsers, a project
named ‘Mycroft’ [13] has been proposed, which is a database of over 20,000 search
engine add-ons supported by multiple browsers.
3.1 Firefox vs Chrome
In new era, out of all the browser extensions, Firefox and Chrome are most
well known because of their popularity, security, and appearance. Below are some of
the notable comparisons between them regarding extensions:
1. Firefox has an outstanding extension base, i.e.,
https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/, that offers more capable add-ons
compared to all other browsers.
2. Firefox add-ons are very powerful and can perform anything that a Firefox
process allows. Security features can be integrated into a Firefox add-on in a
much more effective manner than Chrome extensions. So, it is possible to
develop more advanced add-ons in Firefox, which would not be achievable on
different browsers. Unlike Firefox, Chrome does not trust extensions
completely and they provide very constrained APIs. For instance, without the
user‘s approval, extensions in Chrome can‘t access the resource present outside
of Chrome‘s sandbox, but a Firefox add-on can access the resource in the
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filesystem without the user‘s permission.
For example, even though there are many Chrome extensions like ScriptSafe,
NoScript Lite, which are similar to Firefox’s "NoScript", till now no chrome
extension is able to provide all the features of Firefox’s NoScript because of
the Chrome’s constrained extension APIs.
3. By providing constrained extension APIs, Chrome presents a permission
system and restricts its extensions a bit more for security. Whereas in Firefox,
as the add-ons has more privileges, there are chances of infecting a victim‘s
machine. At worst, we may have to re-install the operating system to undo
the effect created by a malicious add-on. To avoid these potential issues and
to ensure that the add-ons are safe to install, they are manually reviewed
before they publicly appear in the Mozilla add-ons gallery.
To detect JavaScript malware, we have to generate opcodes for the JavaScript
code in the webpage and to save these opcodes we may need access to the user‘s
filesystem and also we need to execute some other external scripts to validate the
JavaScript code based on the saved opcodes. These tasks are only possible with the
powerful APIs provided by Firefox, so we decided to implement a Firefox add-on to
detect metamorphic malware.
3.2 SDK vs XUL
There are two main ways to build Firefox extensions. The traditional way is
using XPCOM (Cross Platform Object Model) and XUL (XML User Interface
Language). Much of Mozilla‘s documentation is focused on XUL add-ons, because
this has been around for many years. More details about XUL add-on development
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can be found at [32]. The add-on SDK is the newer kind and was built under the
Jetpack Project. Jetpack‘s main agenda is to make it easy to build Firefox add-ons
by using HTML, CSS, and JavaScript [3].
It is advisable to use the Add-on SDK because of the advantages it provides
compared to XUL [33]:
1. Simplicity: High-level JavaScript APIs provided by the SDK like basic user
interface components and their functionality simplify all the common tasks in
add-on development.
2. Compatibility : Electrolysis [31], also called e10s, is the project under which
Firefox is being developed with a new multiple process architecture. The
API‘s provided by this SDK are designed to be forward-compatible with this
new architecture.
3. Security: It is not easy to build insecure add-ons using the SDK. Even the
insecure Add-on that was compromised can do much less damage to the
victim‘s machine.
4. No restarts required: To install extensions developed using the SDK, we do
not need to restart the browser.
5. Mobile Support: Add-ons can be developed for Firefox mobile using the
experimental support provided by SDK 1.5
However, XUL provides a huge number of options for the UI when compared
to the SDK, and that‘s the reason XUL is used for developing add-ons that require
a rich user interface.
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In this research, all the add-ons are built using the SDK as it provides simple
APIs for developing most of the common tasks.
3.3 Chrome Authority Usage
Chrome Authority has nothing to do with Google Chrome. The Mozilla
Developer Network(MDN) defines "chrome" as any visible parts of a browser other
than the web pages, For instance, tabs, menu bar, and toolbars.
From the beginning of developing the SDK, it was assumed that developers
may need to access the underlying browser (or) XPCOM services. So, the add-on
SDK was developed to provide "chrome privileges" to the most powerful low level
APIs. The "chrome privileges" grants low-level APIs to access the Components
object that gives unrestricted access to the user system.
With chrome privileges, an add-on can perform any function the browser is
capable of. These privileges can be obtained by the add-on using the "chrome"
module as shown below [1]:
var {Cc, Ci} = require("chrome");
The "chrome" module returns a Components object, which can be unpacked using
the destructuring assignment feature provided by Mozilla JavaScript to obtain the
Components.* aliases:
1. Cc, otherwise called Components.classes
2. Ci, otherwise called Components.interfaces
3. Cu, otherwise called Components.utils.
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4. Cr, otherwise called Components.results.
5. Cm, otherwise called Components.manager.
It is not advisable to use chrome authority in the add-on code unless it is required
because the add-ons that uses chrome authority require extra security review before
they are made available for distribution to the public.
3.4 Content Scripts
The add-on‘s main code, including "main.js" and other modules in "lib", can
use the SDK high-level and low-level APIs, but can‘t access web content directly.
Whereas content scripts can‘t use the SDK‘s APIs, but can access web content.
So if we have to build an Add-on that works based on the content of the web
page, then we have to make use of the content scripts to access the web page
contents. Content scripts are placed in the data subdirectory and they can be
loaded into Add-on using contentScript or contentScriptFile option.
Communicating with the add-on:
To enable add-on scripts and content scripts to communicate with each other,
each end of the conversation has access to a port object.
1. port.emit() is used to send messages from one side to the other
2. port.on() is used to receive messages sent from the other side
Messages are asynchronous i.e., after sending the message, sender continues
processing without waiting for a reply from the recipient.
The add-on code in Figure 28 adds a button to Firefox. When the user clicks
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Figure 27: Communication among add-on and content script [1].
this button, add-on attaches a content script to the active tab, sends the
addon-message to content script. When content script receives add-on message, it
will retrieve the first paragraph from the loaded web page and send it to add-on
along with script-response message. As soon as the add-on receives a response
from content script, it logs the first paragraph.
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1 //main.js
2 var tabs = require("sdk/tabs");
3 var buttons = require("sdk/ui/button/action");
4 var self = require("sdk/self");
5
6 buttons.ActionButton({
7 id: "attach-script",
8 label: "Attach the script",
9 icon: "./icon-16.png",
10 onClick: attachScript
11 });
12
13 function attachScript() {
14 var worker = tabs.activeTab.attach({
15 contentScriptFile: self.data.url("content-script.js")
16 });
17 worker.port.on("script-response", function(response) {
18 console.log(response);
19 });
20 worker.port.emit("addon-message", "Message from the add-on");
21 }
1 // content-script.js
2 self.port.on("addon-message", getFirstPara);
3
4 function getFirstPara() {
5 var paras = document.getElementsByTagName("p");
6 if (paras.length > 0) {
7 var firstPara = paras[0].textContent;
8 self.port.emit("script-response", firstPara);
9 }
10 }
Figure 28: Communication among add-on and content script using code [1].
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CHAPTER 4
Implementation
This chapter focus on the implementation details of two add-ons:
1. a malicious add-on, which can infect the victim‘s filesystem.
2. a Transcriptase detection add-on, which can detect the metamorphic malware
embedded in the web page.
4.1 Malicious add-on
Generally browsers like Firefox, Chrome, and Opera do not allow access to the
client filesystem using JavaScript. Even though creating a file is possible in IE using
ActiveX objects, the client must enable ActiveX scripts on their system for the
ActiveX object related code to execute properly [17].
Firefox add-ons are very powerful because of the high-level APIs that the
SDK provides. The SDK has a file I/O module which provides access to the client‘s
filesystem.
A malicious add-on was created to demonstrate the way that a victim‘s
machine may get infected by a malicious add-on. The basic functionality of this
add-on is it provides the statistic value i.e., the total JavaScript bytes in the page
loaded by the user, as shown in Figure 29.
The user expects this functionality and installs the malicious add-on, but this
add-on also has hidden functionality. Whenever it finds that web page content has
Transcriptase in it, it finds all the JavaScript files present in the filesystem and
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Figure 29: Main Functionality of the malicious add-on
Figure 30: Size of sample JavaScript files before infection
prepends them with Transcriptase code and thus it infects the victim‘s filesystem.
Figure 30 shows the size of our sample JavaScript files before infection and
figure 31 shows the size of these files after infection. There is a huge difference in file
36
Figure 31: JavaScript file sizes after infection
sizes before and after infection. This infection will remain unknown to the user until
the infected files are checked.
4.2 Transcriptase detection add-on
As discussed in Section 2.4, the Transcriptase virus uses different techniques
to change its internal structure in order to evade the signature based detection
strategy. The Transcriptase detection add-on can detect the Transcriptase malware
included in the webpage and notifies the user about the presence of malware
without loading the JavaScript malware.
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4.2.1 Malware Detection Technique
Despite the fact that metamorphic malware continuously changes its internal
structure to stay undetected, still for maintaining its functionality malware places
similar instructions (that implements the functionality) somewhere in the code.
Thus, all the morphed copies maintain the same statistical distribution of
instructions. Different malware detection strategies are designed to make use of
these statistical properties like Hidden Markov Models, Opcode Graph Similarity,
Simple Substitution Distance, and Singular Value Decomposition.
As mentioned in [4], if the files are having highly similar opcode statistics,
then Opcode Graph Similarity and Singular Value Decomposition can classify them
better than the Hidden Markov Model and Simple Substitution Distance. Opcode
Graph Similarity and Singular Value Decomposition are very sensitive to deadcode,
but from the results mentioned in [4] these strategies won‘t be able to distinguish
between benign code and virus code only after adding 5000 and 9000 deadcode
functions into the virus code respectively. And it is extremely uncommon for a web
page to have this much dead code. Adding to this, the ROC curves in [4] shows that
Opcode Graph Similarity performs better than Singular Value Decomposition with
less than 1000 dead code function insertions.
We used Opcode Graph Similarity technique in the Transcriptase detection
add-on.
4.2.2 Opcode Graph Similarity Technique
In [2], Anderson introduced a malware detection technique which is based on
analysis of graphs that are constructed using the opcodes of the malware code and
test code. In this technique, initially opcodes are extracted from the malware code
38
and a weighted directed graph is built using the sequence of opcodes. Similarly, a
graph is built for the code to be tested. The Manhattan distance between these two
weighted graphs specifies the test file score [4].
4.2.3 Opcode Graph
A weighted directed graph built using the sequence of opcodes is known as the
‘Opcode Graph’. Each node of this graph specifies a distinct opcode in opcode
sequence. A directed edge exists from 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐴 to 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐵, if 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐵‘s opcode follows the
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐴‘s opcode in the opcode sequence. The weight of the edge from 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐴 to
𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐵 specifies the total number of times that 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐵‘s opcode follows 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐴‘s
opcode in the entire code.
1 PUSH
2 MOV
3 SUB
4 AND
5 MOV
6 TEST
7 JZ
8 INT
9 MOVZX
10 AND
11 MOV
12 MOVZX
13 OR
14 MOV
15 MOV
16 CALL
17 LEAVE
18 RETN
19 ALIGN
20 PUSH
21 MOV
22 MOV
23 PUSH
24 PUSH
25 SUB
26 MOV
27 MOV
28 CALL
29 AND
30 SUB
31 CALL
32 MOV
33 CALL
34 MOV
35 XOR
36 MOV
37 MOV
38 MOV
39 CALL
40 MOV
Figure 32: Sample opcode sequence.
Figure 32 shows the sample opcode sequence. The adjacency matrix in
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A
LI
G
N
A
N
D
C
A
LL
IN
T
JZ LE
AV
E
M
O
V
M
O
V
ZX
O
R
P
U
SH
R
E
T
N
SU
B
T
E
ST
X
O
R
ALIGN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
AND 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
CALL 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
INT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
JZ 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LEAVE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
MOV 0 0 4 0 0 0 5 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
MOVZX 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
OR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PUSH 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
RETN 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUB 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TEST 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
XOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 33: Weight counts adjacency matrix for opcodes in Figure 32.
Figure 33 specifies the weights of the edges formed between these opcodes. For
instance, we can find that intersection entry between the CALL row and MOV
column has a weight value of 3, which means there are three occurrences of a MOV
instruction immediately followed by a CALL instruction in the opcode sequence i.e.,
at line numbers 15, 27, and 32 in Figure 32.
All the weight counts in Figure 33 are converted into probability values by
dividing each row entry by the corresponding row sum. Figure 34 shows the weight
probabilities for the Figure 33. Each weight probability specifies the probability of
occurrence of a particular opcode, immediately after the selected opcode [4].
Figure 35 shows the opcode graph for the probability matrix in Figure 34
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A
LI
G
N
A
N
D
C
A
LL
IN
T
JZ LE
AV
E
M
O
V
M
O
V
ZX
O
R
P
U
SH
R
E
T
N
SU
B
T
E
ST
X
O
R
ALIGN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/1 0 0 0 0
AND 0 0 0 0 0 0 2/3 0 0 0 0 1/3 0 0
CALL 0 1/5 0 0 0 1/5 3/5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
INT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/1 0 0 0 0 0 0
JZ 0 0 0 1/1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LEAVE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/1 0 0 0
MOV 0 0 4/14 0 0 0 5/14 1/14 0 1/14 0 1/14 1/14 1/14
MOVZX 0 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 0 0 0
OR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PUSH 0 0 0 0 0 0 2/4 0 0 1/4 0 1/4 0 0
RETN 1/1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SUB 0 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TEST 0 0 0 0 1/1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
XOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 34: Probability matrix for weights adjacency matrix in Figure 33.
4.2.4 Similarity Score Calculation
After creating probability matrices for the malware file and the test file,
similarity between two files is calculated by taking the Manhattan distance between
two probability matrices. Consider 𝐴 as the probability matrix of file 1 and each
element in 𝐴 is denoted as 𝐴𝑖,𝑗 where 𝑖 and 𝑗 specifies 𝑖𝑡ℎ row and 𝑗𝑡ℎ column
respectively. Similarly 𝐵 is the probability matrix of file 2 and each element in 𝐵 is
denoted as 𝐵𝑖,𝑗. Similarity between matrix 𝐴 and 𝐵, is calculated as below [8],
Similarity score = 1
𝑁2
(
∑︀𝑁−1
𝑖,𝑗=0 |𝑎𝑖,𝑗 −𝑏𝑖,𝑗 |2)
where N is total number of distinct opcodes present in the combination of
both files.
Before using the similarity score, we have to determine the threshold score
which distinguishes between benign files and malware files. The threshold value is
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Figure 35: opcode graph for the probability matrix in Figure [8].
determined as follows [8],
1. Construct opcode graphs for all the variants of metamorphic malwares.
2. Construct opcode graphs for all the benign files.
3. Calculate the similarity scores for all pairs of malwares.
4. Calculate the similarity scores for every benign file against malware from step
1.
5. Determine a threshold value using the scores calculated in steps 3 and 4.
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4.3 Transcriptase detection add-on architecture
Figure 36: Detection add-on architecture
Figure 36 shows the detection add-on architecture. Each component in the
architecture is made up of one or more files. Figure 37 depicts the directory
structure of detection add-on.
1. "content-script.js" uses jQuery code to find the JavaScipt content in web page,
so included "jquery-1.10.0.min.js" file in the "/data" directory to enable this
functionality. content-script.js represents "Content Script" component.
2. The Java files in the add-on are used to download the files, and to calculate
the similarity score. All these files are placed in the "/data/java" directory.
"Java Downloader" is a combination of DownloadThread, DownloaderApp,
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Sravans−MacBook−Pro:TranscriptaseDetectionAddon sravan2j$ tree
.
|−− data
| |−− content−script.js
| |−− icon−16.png
| |−− icon−32.png
| |−− icon−64.png
| |−− java
| | |−− CheckOpcodes.class
| | |−− DownloadThread.class
| | |−− DownloaderApp.class
| | |−− GetScore.class
| | |−− ImageDownloader.class
| | |−− Lock.class
| |−− javaext.js
| |−− jquery−1.10.0.min.js
| |−− js.jar
| |−− malware_opcodes.txt
| |−− opcodes.bat
| |−− opcodes.sh
|−− lib
| |−− main.js
|−− package.json
|−− test
|−− test−main.js
4 directories, 17 files
Figure 37: Transcriptase detection add-on directory structure
ImageDownloader, and Lock class files. CheckOpcodes and GetScore class files
represents "opcode graph similarity detector".
3. "js.jar" helps the add-on to use the Rhino JS engine.
4. "opcode.sh" is a shell script to invoke Java files. As shell scripts won‘t work on
Windows, the "opcode.bat" file is included to invoke Java files on Windows.
5. The "malware_opcodes.txt" file specifies "Malware opcodes" component. This
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file contains the opcodes of Transcriptase family malware which is required to
validate web page JS content using the opcode graph similarity technique.
More details about these files and the architecture components are covered in
subsequent sections.
4.4 JavaScript extraction from web page
As soon as the user enters a web page link, the browser loads the JavaScript
content along with HTML and CSS on the page. Before extracting the JS from web
page, we have to disable JS load in the browser to prevent the execution of JS
malware code.
Enabling/disabling JS feature deals with browser preferences. The preferences
system of Mozilla browser can be accessed using XPCOM interfaces like
𝑛𝑠𝐼𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 and 𝑛𝑠𝐼𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ. The below code is used to disable
JavaScript code,
1 var prefSrv = this.prefService = Cc["@mozilla.org/preferences-service;1"]
2 .getService(Ci.nsIPrefService);
3 var PBI = Ci.nsIPrefBranch2;
4 this.mozJSPref = prefSrv.getBranch("javascript.").QueryInterface(PBI);
5 this.mozJSPref.setBoolPref("enabled", false);
Figure 38: Add-on code to disable JavaScript load on web page.
The code in Figure 38 is interpreted as follows: Line 1 in the above code
retrieves the preference services of Mozilla. nsIPrefBranch2 interface, in line 2,
allows the add-on to listen to the changes to preferences. Line 3 retrieves the
"javascript" preference and queues nsIPrefBranch2 interface using QueryInterface().
Later, setBoolPref() method is used to disable the JS by setting "false" to
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"enabled". Similarly the below line of code enables JS load,
1 this.mozJSPref.setBoolPref("enabled", true);
After disabling JavaScript, as explained in Section 3.4, the content script i.e.,
"content-script.js", is used to extract JS. "content-script.js" uses jQuery element
selector to find all the <script> elements and extract the JavaScript instructions
contained in <script> tags as shown below:
var code="";
$("script").each(function(){
code=code+$(this).html();
});
Sometimes, JavaScript code is also placed in an external file and the location of the
external JavaScript file is specified in the web page using a src attribute of a
<script> element as shown below:
<script src="external_javascript.js"></script>
There is a chance that this external files may contain JavaScript malware code, so
using the code in Figure 39, all the external file‘s URLs are extracted from the web
page. Following is the explanation of the code snippet in Figure 39:
1. "window.location.protocol" returns the protocol of the current web page URL
along with colon(:). For instance, "http:", "https:", "ftp:".
"window.location.host" returns the host name of the web page. For instance,
the hostname of
"http://www.somewebsite.com/tryit.jsp?filename=sample_code" is
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1 var baseUrl = window.location.protocol + "//" + window.location.host + "/";
2 var Urls = "";
3 var regex = new RegExp("^(?:[a-z]+:)?//", "i");
4 $("script[src]").each(function(){
5 var sourceurl = $(this).attr("src");
6 if(!regex.test(sourceurl))
7 {
8 Urls=Urls+baseUrl;
9 }
10 Urls=Urls+(sourceurl.replace(/^\/+/, ""))+"\n";
11 });
Figure 39: JavaScript to extract all the external script file URLs
"www.somewebsite.com". So, line 1 creates a base URL of the web page.
2. line 4 uses a jQuery element selector to retrieve the external file locations
defined in src attribute of <script> tag.
3. line 6 uses regex to test whether the external files location is relative or
absolute path.
4. Line 8 contains the logic for prepending the base URL to an external file
location, if the external file location is relative path.
5. Finally, the "Urls" variable contains all the external local URLs, and these
URLs will be saved in a temporary file.
Later, the add-on invokes the 𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠.𝑠ℎ file as shown in Figure 41, which
performs the following two functions:
Creates a temporary file
"TmpD" returns the temporary directory location of the OS. In line 1,
"opcodes.tmp" filename is concatenated to temporary directory path and
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getFile() method returns a nsIFile object referring to
"<TMP_DIR>/opcodes.tmp" location. Then createUnique() method creates
the requested temporary file.
Invokes opcode.sh
The nsIProcess interface is used to execute a process. nsIProcess requires
executable name to execute and if the executable file requires any parameters
then these parameters need to be passed as args[] to the nsIProcess.
1. Line 3 and 4 creates a nsIFile object referring to executable "/bin/sh".
2. Line 5 and 6 creates an instance of process and initializes it to "/bin/sh"
executable.
3. Line 7 and 8 adds both "opcode.sh" file path and temporary file path to
"args" array. Then the process is executed using run() which executes
the below command internally,
$ /bin/sh
/Users/sravan2j/Downloads/TranscriptaseDetectionAddon/data/opcode.sh
/tmp/opcodes.tmp
Figure 40: command that invokes opcode.sh internally
4.5 Purpose of the Shell script
The opcodes.sh code, shown in Figure 42, performs the following three
functions:
1. Line 1 executes following Java files - 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑.𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠,
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑝𝑝.𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠, 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟.𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠, and 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘.𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠, to download
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1 Cu.import("resource://gre/modules/FileUtils.jsm");
2
3 // create a temporary file
4 var file = FileUtils.getFile("TmpD", ["opcodes.tmp"]);
5 file.createUnique(Ci.nsIFile.NORMAL_FILE_TYPE, 0600);
6
7 var file = Cc["@mozilla.org/file/local;1"].
8 createInstance(Ci.nsILocalFile);
9 file.initWithPath("/bin/sh");
10
11 var process = Cc["@mozilla.org/process/util;1"]
12 .createInstance(Ci.nsIProcess);
13 process.init(file);
14
15 var args =
["/Users/sravan2j/Downloads/TranscriptaseDetectionAddon/data/opcode.sh"];
16 // append temporary file path to parameters
17 args.push(tmpFile.path);
18 process.run(true, args, args.length);
Figure 41: add-on code that creates temporary file and invokes opcode.sh with tem-
porary file
all the external scripts. This java files uses multi threading approach to
download all the external scripts in parallel which reduces the total download
time.
2. After the above step, the entire JavaScript content will be saved in the
/tmp/JSStatements.js file. Line 2 takes the JSStatements.js file as input and
generates opcodes for the JavaScript code in JSStatements.js using the Rhino
JS engine. The output of this step is the "/tmp/opcodes.txt" file.
3. Line 3 executes CheckOpcodes java code which calculates the similarity score
using the opcode similarity technique, between malware_opcodes.txt and the
opcodes.txt file. The output of this step is redirected to "$1", which refers to
the arguments passed to opcodes.sh. The bash command in Figure 40 shows
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that the /tmp/opcodes.tmp file is passed as an argument while calling
opcode.sh.
1 java -Xmx500m -cp "." data/DownloaderApp data/externalUrls.txt
2 java -cp "./data/js.jar" org.mozilla.javascript.tools.jsc.Main
/tmp/JSStatements.js > /tmp/opcodes.txt
3 java -cp "./data" CheckOpcodes data/malware_opcodes.txt /tmp/opcodes.txt >
$1
Figure 42: opcode.sh shell script code
4.6 Page validation and clean-up step
The add-on gets the similarity score from the opcodes.tmp file. If the score is
less than the threshold value i.e., 0.01, then the web page is considered as a
malicious page or else it is a benign page.
1. If the page is benign, then it enables JavaScript and reloads the web page.
2. If the page is malicious, then the web page won’t be loaded; instead a prompt
is displayed to the user regarding the malware.
At the end, all the temporary files created will be removed as part of the clean-up
step.
4.7 Performance improvements
As the add-on performs lot of steps to validate the web page, the execution
time will be more. So, instead of validating every web page every time, we can skip
the validation during the following scenarios:
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4.7.1 Fingerprinting web pages
The hashcode of the benign web page should be saved in the user directory. In
the future, when user visits the same web page and if the internal content of the
page is not changed from the last visit, then the hash code of the page remains the
same as the one that was saved on user‘s machine. In this case, we can safely skip
the validation of the web page.
The disadvantage with this approach is that it consumes the user‘s system
memory as it saves the hashcode for every web page the user visits.
We can also improve this approach by saving the hash codes in the cloud
repository. Whenever any user visits the web page, the add-on connects with the
cloud repository and checks if this web page was already validated by any user
earlier or not. If it was validated, is the web page hash code the same? And what is
the validation result? If the hash code is not in the cloud, then it will be validated
by the current user‘s plugin and the result will be stored in the cloud, so that this
data will be useful for other users. Because of this approach, the user‘s system
memory will be saved and also at any point of time, the web page is validated only
once by any user. Necessary security measures should be taken inorder to prevent
the attacks like man-in-the-middle attack, cloud data tampering.
4.7.2 Whitelisting websites
Some popular websites are highly secured and regularly monitored, like
Google, Facebook, Amazon etc. These websites can be added to benign page list by
the user, so that they won‘t be validated by the add-on.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it involves a risk of infection if the
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whitelisted web pages are infected by malware.
4.8 Using other detection techniques
Currently this add-on uses only opcode graph similarity detection. Other
detection techniques can be used in the add-on by simply changing line 3 of
opcode.sh, shown in 42, to execute a program that implements another detection
technique instead of executing the CheckOpcodes program. The new program
should accept "malware_opcodes.txt" and "/tmp/opcodes.txt" as input files and
the similarity score should be saved in the "/tmp/opcodes.tmp" file. No other
changes are required.
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CHAPTER 5
Testing
To check the accuracy and performance of the add-on, we used malware web
pages and benign web pages. To create malware samples, we generated different
variants of Transcriptase malware. For benign web pages, we retrieved the
JavaScript dead code from http://tools.w3clubs.com/jojo/.
Entire testing is performed on a system with the configuration specified in
Table 1:
Table 1: System Specifications
System Model MacBook Pro (Retina, 13-inch, Mid 2014)
Processor 2.8 GHz Intel Core i5
RAM 16 GB 1600 MHz DDR3
Storage 120 GB
Firefox version 36.0.4
SDK version Add-on SDK 1.17
Rhino version Rhino 1.7R4, modified to output opcodes during JS compilation
Java version 1.7.0_71
5.1 Generating Transcriptase variants
Transcriptase was written in JScript, so in a windows system it can be
executed by simply double clicking it. From my observation, the generation of each
version takes around 15 minutes.
As explained in Section 2.4, Transcriptase carries its source code as meta
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instructions and on each execution it creates different variant of its JS source, then
prepends that JS code to all the JavaScript files in its directory. So, I followed the
below steps to create 100 versions:
1. Created an empty JavaScript file in the Transcriptase directory.
2. Executed Transcriptase, which infects the new empty JavaScript file and
converts it to another variant of Transcriptase.
3. Move the older version Transcriptase (or creator Transcriptase) to different
folder.
4. Then created an empty JavaScript file in the current folder where the new
Transcriptase variant exists.
5. Executed the new variant to infect the empty JavaScript file. Go to Step 3 if
the required number of variants aren‘t generated.
The code in Figure 43 automates the above mentioned steps.
1 FOR %%A IN (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
97 98 99 100) DO (
2 transcriptase.js
3 REN transcriptase.js "var%%~nA.*"
4 MOVE "var%%~nA.*" "C:\Users\Sravan\Downloads\Transcriptase\versions"
5 REN empty.js transcriptase.js
6 COPY "C:\Users\Sravan\Downloads\Transcriptase\template\empty.js" .
7 )
8 PAUSE
Figure 43: Batch script that automates the Transcriptase variants generations
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Figure 44: Transcriptase‘s 100 versions.
5.2 Similarity scores and add-on performance
Included console.log() functions in the add-on to log the following details -
opcode similarity score and the add-on execution time taken to validate the web
page. The below sub section deals with comparison of these details for benign and
malware web pages. For testing the add-on, we used 100 samples of benign web
page and morphed malware web pages. Malware web pages are morphed by adding
randomly generated junk code to it.
5.2.1 Addition of 550 lines of dead code
For this experiment, we used benign web page samples with 550 lines of junk
code and also added the same amount of randomly generated junk code to malware
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web pages. Tables 2 and 3 contain the details of scores and execution time for the
benign and malware samples, respectively. From the table values, we can see that
the scores for benign web pages are in the order of 10−3 whereas the scores for
malware web pages are in the order of 10−4. The graph in Figure 45 clearly shows
that the add-on is able to distinguish malware web pages and benign web pages
correctly. Only 3 out of 100 malware samples have score similar to benign web
pages.
Figure 45: Benign samples scores vs malware samples scores with the addition of 550
lines of dead code
5.2.2 Addition of 5500 lines of dead code
This experiment is same as the above experiment except that here 5500 lines
of dead code was included in malware and benign web pages instead of 500 lines.
Tables 4 and 5 contains the details of scores and execution time for this experiment.
From the table values, we can see that the scores for benign web pages and malware
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web pages are still in the order of 10−3 and 10−4, respectively. The graph in
Figure 46 clearly shows that even after adding 5500 lines of code, the add-on is able
to distinguish malware web pages and benign web pages correctly. Only 3 out of 100
malware samples have scores similar to benign web pages.
Figure 46: Benign samples scores vs malware samples scores with the addition of 5500
lines of dead code
5.2.3 Addition of 15000 lines of dead code
Here, 15000 lines of dead code were included in malware and benign samples.
From the tables 6 and 7, it is clear that scores of malware web pages are varied by a
very negligible value when compared to previous experiments. So as shown in
Figure 47, the add-on is still able to distinguish malware web pages and benign web
pages correctly.
As mentioned in Section 4.2.4, the scores of malware files and benign files can
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Figure 47: Benign samples scores vs malware samples scores with the addition of
15000 lines of dead code
be compared to calculate the threshold score value of the opcode similarity
technique. From the tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, except 9 malwares all other malware
scores are in between 0.000369822260 and 0.000369822750. The 9 exception
malware scores are between 0.001423994000 and 0.001423994700. And the benign
web page scores are between 0.001479288900 and 0.001479291400. The same
information is represented with table 8
The threshold value can be any value between 0.00142 and 0.00147. If the
lower percentage of false negative rate is acceptable, then the threshold score can be
chosen between 0.00036 and 0.00147. In case of malware detection, it is always
better to have fewer false negatives, so I use 0.00145 as the threshold score value
for the add-on.
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5.3 Test for False Positive rate of the add-on
I tested the add-on on popular web sites to detect the "false positive" rate of
the add-on. The popular web site links are retrieved from [34].
The table 9 contains the scores and execution time details. All the scores in
the table are more than the chosen threshold value (i.e., 0.00145), which means that
the add-on validated all the web pages as benign web pages i.e., add-on has zero
false positive rate.
5.4 Splitting Transcriptase code
Transcriptase can be split into several external JS files and then the external
files can be included in a web page. So, the following experiment was performed to
calculate the scores of split files by dividing Transcriptase into a various number of
files.
The code was split based on functions count. The experiment was started by
dividing the Transcriptase code into two files with almost equal number of functions
and then continued till the split files count reaches 76. A parser was developed in
Python to detect the valid start and end point of the JavaScript functions and to
properly split the Transcriptase code. Thus the resultant split files are syntactically
correct. Corresponding parser code is shown in Appendix A, Section A.1.
Table 10 shows the results for various splits. The "Max" and "Min" column
specify the maximum and minimum similarity score among the split files,
respectively. The "count" column specifies the number of files the Transcriptase
code was split into.
Figure 48 is a graphical representation of the Table 10 values. The graph
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clearly shows that even when the code was split, the minimum score among the
split files is always less than threshold which means that there always
exists at least one split file with score a less than threshold score. Thus, it
is possible to detect the malware even by testing all the external files separately. So,
we can validate all the external scripts parallely to increase the performance of the
add-on.
Figure 48: Graph showing min and max scores of Transcriptase split files.
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0.00147929 1136 0.00147929 1135 0.00147929 1482 0.0014792903 1232
0.00147929 1172 0.0014792896 1124 0.0014792896 1304 0.0014792907 1115
0.00147929 1150 0.0014792907 1113 0.00147929 1245 0.00147929 1308
0.00147929 1125 0.0014792903 1178 0.0014792907 1274 0.0014792896 1159
0.0014792893 1080 0.0014792896 1133 0.0014792896 1235 0.00147929 1125
0.00147929 1223 0.0014792903 1133 0.0014792903 1242 0.0014792903 1228
0.0014792896 1125 0.00147929 1134 0.0014792903 1246 0.0014792896 1180
0.0014792903 1132 0.0014792893 1106 0.0014792903 1250 0.0014792893 1131
0.001479291 1120 0.00147929 1142 0.0014792903 1257 0.00147929 1136
0.0014792903 1198 0.0014792896 1159 0.0014792903 1255 0.0014792907 1132
0.0014792903 1134 0.0014792896 1125 0.0014792903 1214 0.0014792896 1141
0.0014792907 1131 0.0014792907 1122 0.0014792903 1152 0.00147929 1134
0.0014792903 1108 0.00147929 1176 0.0014792896 1116 0.0014792896 1124
0.00147929 1110 0.0014792903 1134 0.0014792907 1138 0.0014792903 1410
0.00147929 1124 0.0014792893 1113 0.00147929 1105 0.0014792907 1123
0.0014792893 1122 0.00147929 1168 0.0014792907 1093 0.00147929 1150
0.0014792907 1116 0.00147929 1135 0.0014792903 1175 0.0014792903 1175
0.0014792896 1117 0.0014792907 1118 0.0014792907 1121 0.0014792903 1116
0.0014792903 1198 0.0014792903 1148 0.0014792903 1127 0.0014792893 1125
0.00147929 1122 0.0014792907 1102 0.0014792903 1167 0.0014792896 1143
0.00147929 1137 0.0014792893 1144 0.0014792903 1105 0.0014792903 1223
0.00147929 1204 0.0014792896 1098 0.0014792907 1113 0.0014792903 1120
0.0014792907 1130 0.00147929 1152 0.0014792896 1111 0.0014792907 1140
0.00147929 1104 0.0014792903 1129 0.00147929 1140 0.00147929 1213
0.0014792903 1119 0.00147929 1215 0.00147929 1149 0.00147929 1119
Table 2: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 benign web
pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Benign webpages are generated
with 550 lines of dead code.
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0.00036982258 7897 0.00036982243 6707 0.00036982258 7888 0.0003698225 6642
0.00036982258 6875 0.001423994 7493 0.00036982243 8133 0.00036982234 7355
0.00036982258 6284 0.0003698224 6041 0.0003698224 8576 0.00036982235 7489
0.0014239943 6430 0.00036982266 7119 0.00036982258 7785 0.00036982266 7072
0.00036982234 7629 0.0003698225 7223 0.00036982243 8536 0.00036982258 6941
0.00036982238 7682 0.00036982258 7159 0.00036982234 7118 0.0003698225 7372
0.00036982266 7774 0.0003698225 8297 0.0003698225 7138 0.00036982243 7832
0.00036982266 8075 0.00036982243 6949 0.00036982243 6917 0.00036982258 7158
0.0003698225 6127 0.00036982243 8550 0.00036982243 6475 0.00036982258 6603
0.00036982258 7312 0.0003698225 7157 0.00036982243 8109 0.0003698224 8482
0.00036982258 8038 0.0003698225 7532 0.00036982258 7013 0.00036982243 7718
0.00036982258 10123 0.0003698224 6904 0.00036982258 6740 0.00036982258 6723
0.00036982236 8091 0.0003698225 6679 0.0003698225 7239 0.00036982258 8046
0.00036982245 6392 0.00036982258 7031 0.0003698225 7138 0.0003698225 7845
0.00036982238 6518 0.00036982258 6438 0.00036982258 6088 0.00036982258 7862
0.00036982251 7121 0.00036982266 8230 0.00036982243 7529 0.00036982258 9817
0.00036982243 6309 0.0003698225 9986 0.0003698224 8031 0.0003698224 7804
0.00036982258 8646 0.0003698225 6958 0.0003698224 7753 0.0003698225 9849
0.00036982243 6706 0.00036982243 10166 0.0014239943 6494 0.0003698225 9302
0.00036982258 6617 0.0003698225 8358 0.00036982258 6815 0.00036982256 7239
0.00036982241 6502 0.00036982251 6129 0.00036982266 8174 0.00036982263 7652
0.00036982232 7289 0.00036982249 6732 0.00036982275 8314 0.0003698225 7261
0.0003698224 7236 0.00036982258 7730 0.00036982266 7465 0.00036982258 6398
0.00036982258 7746 0.00036982258 7719 0.00036982266 7113 0.0003698225 8812
0.00036982243 7267 0.00036982258 7992 0.00036982258 6757 0.00036982243 8357
Table 3: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 malware web
pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Malware webpages are morphed
with 550 lines of dead code.
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0.0014792907 2287 0.0014792903 1937 0.00147929 2379 0.0014792903 3148
0.00147929 2447 0.0014792893 2813 0.0014792896 1966 0.0014792907 2210
0.00147929 2215 0.0014792903 2153 0.0014792903 2728 0.0014792903 2094
0.0014792907 2376 0.0014792903 2604 0.00147929 2167 0.0014792903 2068
0.00147929 2188 0.0014792914 2221 0.0014792903 2022 0.0014792907 2462
0.0014792903 2661 0.00147929 2152 0.0014792907 2383 0.0014792893 2060
0.0014792907 1989 0.0014792903 2404 0.0014792903 2033 0.00147929 2074
0.00147929 2137 0.00147929 2260 0.00147929 2463 0.0014792903 2254
0.0014792903 2001 0.0014792907 2110 0.0014792903 2535 0.0014792893 2564
0.0014792907 2003 0.0014792893 2226 0.0014792903 2026 0.0014792903 2084
0.00147929 2646 0.0014792903 2134 0.0014792907 2030 0.0014792903 2406
0.0014792903 1969 0.0014792903 2115 0.0014792907 1944 0.0014792903 2437
0.0014792903 1972 0.0014792903 2003 0.0014792893 2239 0.0014792889 2317
0.0014792903 1937 0.0014792893 1989 0.0014792893 2270 0.0014792903 2001
0.0014792903 1992 0.00147929 2599 0.00147929 1954 0.0014792903 1933
0.0014792896 2612 0.0014792893 2277 0.0014792907 1961 0.00147929 1994
0.0014792903 2092 0.0014792896 1971 0.0014792893 2240 0.0014792903 1967
0.0014792907 2453 0.0014792903 2388 0.0014792907 2280 0.00147929 2279
0.0014792903 2028 0.00147929 1983 0.00147929 1966 0.0014792903 1968
0.00147929 2018 0.0014792903 1996 0.0014792903 1985 0.001479291 1978
0.0014792903 2010 0.0014792903 1990 0.00147929 1978 0.0014792907 1946
0.0014792896 1981 0.0014792903 2034 0.00147929 1995 0.0014792903 1980
0.0014792893 1967 0.00147929 1980 0.0014792907 1987 0.00147929 1942
0.0014792903 1938 0.0014792903 2005 0.00147929 1962 0.00147929 1989
0.0014792896 2324 0.0014792903 2103 0.0014792907 2497 0.0014792903 1985
Table 4: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 benign web
pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Benign webpages are generated
with 5500 lines of dead code.
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0.00036982243 8233 0.00036982243 8232 0.0003698225 8499 0.00036982258 7472
0.0003698225 7442 0.0014239947 8681 0.0003698225 7973 0.00036982226 8276
0.0003698225 7297 0.0003698225 6720 0.0003698224 8310 0.00036982235 8916
0.0014239941 7827 0.0003698225 7818 0.00036982258 7843 0.00036982243 7925
0.00036982258 7850 0.00036982258 8466 0.00036982258 7476 0.00036982258 7405
0.00036982247 8132 0.00036982243 7717 0.00036982234 7933 0.0003698224 8014
0.00036982258 8478 0.0003698225 9749 0.00036982258 7844 0.0003698225 8181
0.0003698225 8910 0.00036982243 7992 0.00036982234 9089 0.0003698225 7358
0.0003698224 7029 0.0003698225 7495 0.00036982243 7412 0.00036982266 7505
0.00036982234 8039 0.00036982258 7474 0.0003698225 9174 0.00036982275 8958
0.00036982234 7937 0.00036982243 7743 0.0003698225 7246 0.00036982258 8510
0.00036982258 8008 0.00036982266 7970 0.0003698225 7440 0.0003698225 7740
0.00036982243 8012 0.00036982266 8106 0.00036982258 8472 0.00036982258 8390
0.00036982257 7884 0.00036982258 7892 0.0003698224 7832 0.00036982258 8352
0.00036982241 8593 0.0003698225 7070 0.0003698225 6720 0.00036982243 8671
0.00036982249 8147 0.0003698225 7188 0.00036982243 8236 0.0003698224 8519
0.0003698225 7143 0.00036982232 8449 0.00036982258 8064 0.0003698225 6830
0.0003698225 8747 0.00036982266 7731 0.00036982243 8323 0.0003698224 8421
0.00036982258 7226 0.00036982258 8379 0.0014239943 7039 0.00036982243 8282
0.00036982258 7001 0.00036982243 9518 0.00036982251 7213 0.00036982249 7813
0.00036982249 6871 0.00036982249 9287 0.00036982243 9476 0.00036982252 8132
0.00036982243 7892 0.00036982252 8936 0.00036982266 8468 0.0003698224 7930
0.0003698225 7989 0.0003698224 8250 0.00036982243 8304 0.0003698225 7418
0.00036982234 7814 0.0003698224 8658 0.00036982258 7766 0.0003698225 9372
0.0003698225 8370 0.00036982258 8248 0.00036982258 7644 0.00036982266 8933
Table 5: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 malware web
pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Malware webpages are morphed
with 5500 lines of dead code.
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0.0014792903 3241 0.001479291 3301 0.0014792903 3274 0.0014792903 3484
0.0014792903 3180 0.00147929 3162 0.00147929 3355 0.0014792896 3342
0.00147929 3172 0.0014792896 3134 0.00147929 3345 0.0014792903 3415
0.0014792893 3291 0.0014792903 3150 0.00147929 3185 0.0014792896 3409
0.001479291 3161 0.0014792896 3545 0.0014792907 3184 0.0014792896 3536
0.0014792903 3178 0.00147929 3104 0.00147929 3445 0.00147929 3540
0.0014792907 3182 0.00147929 3167 0.0014792896 4519 0.0014792903 3794
0.00147929 3378 0.0014792896 3307 0.00147929 3448 0.0014792896 3786
0.00147929 3575 0.0014792907 3192 0.0014792907 3361 0.0014792896 3696
0.00147929 3563 0.0014792896 3131 0.00147929 3181 0.0014792896 3513
0.0014792903 3271 0.0014792903 3216 0.0014792903 3383 0.0014792903 3405
0.0014792907 3188 0.0014792889 3320 0.0014792903 4725 0.0014792907 3608
0.0014792903 3122 0.0014792896 3137 0.0014792903 3602 0.00147929 3275
0.00147929 3467 0.0014792903 3225 0.0014792907 3217 0.0014792893 3439
0.0014792903 3197 0.0014792903 3328 0.00147929 3464 0.00147929 3700
0.0014792907 3149 0.0014792903 3329 0.00147929 3159 0.0014792907 3230
0.0014792893 3139 0.00147929 3201 0.0014792903 4870 0.00147929 3221
0.0014792893 3100 0.0014792896 3171 0.0014792896 3244 0.0014792907 3199
0.00147929 3206 0.0014792903 4664 0.00147929 3292 0.0014792896 3239
0.0014792903 3139 0.00147929 3105 0.00147929 3417 0.00147929 3133
0.0014792896 3159 0.0014792893 3177 0.0014792903 3341 0.0014792903 3300
0.001479291 3102 0.00147929 3467 0.00147929 4321 0.0014792903 3420
0.0014792903 3267 0.0014792903 3426 0.00147929 3587 0.0014792896 5329
0.00147929 3359 0.00147929 3421 0.0014792893 3333 0.0014792907 3614
0.0014792903 3412 0.00147929 3400 0.001479291 3289 0.0014792903 3450
Table 6: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 benign web
pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Benign webpages are generated
with 15000 lines of dead code.
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0.00036982258 9192 0.0003698224 9179 0.0003698225 9225 0.00036982266 8274
0.00036982258 9105 0.0003698225 7719 0.0003698225 9240 0.00036982258 8962
0.0003698225 9104 0.00036982258 8207 0.0003698225 9458 0.00036982263 9132
0.0003698225 9303 0.00036982243 9510 0.00036982266 8810 0.0003698225 8588
0.00036982258 8568 0.00036982258 9779 0.00036982243 8545 0.0003698224 8185
0.00036982241 9942 0.0003698225 9537 0.0014239943 8158 0.0003698224 8915
0.00036982266 9502 0.00036982266 9766 0.00036982258 8540 0.00036982266 9395
0.0003698224 9791 0.0003698225 8802 0.0003698225 9080 0.00036982258 8165
0.0003698225 7951 0.00036982243 10122 0.00036982258 9233 0.00036982234 8113
0.0003698225 8565 0.0003698225 9180 0.0003698224 8556 0.0003698225 9760
0.0003698225 8059 0.00036982234 8254 0.0003698224 9702 0.0003698224 9330
0.0003698225 8889 0.00036982258 8146 0.00036982258 9082 0.00036982258 8756
0.0003698225 8884 0.00036982258 7851 0.0003698225 9281 0.0003698225 9336
0.00036982235 9126 0.00036982258 8672 0.00036982258 8465 0.0003698225 8828
0.00036982251 9631 0.00036982258 7948 0.00036982258 9770 0.00036982258 9277
0.0003698226 8128 0.00036982266 8689 0.00036982258 9211 0.0003698225 9478
0.00036982243 7919 0.0003698225 8264 0.00036982243 9809 0.00036982258 7847
0.0003698225 9433 0.0003698225 8562 0.0003698224 9109 0.00036982266 9312
0.0003698225 8202 0.00036982258 8119 0.001423994 9592 0.00036982266 8933
0.00036982243 8400 0.00036982266 8845 0.0014239942 1070 0.00036982249 9612
0.00036982252 9783 0.00036982266 8845 0.00036982266 9750 0.00036982258 8495
0.00036982258 8811 0.00036982266 8845 0.00036982243 9469 0.0003698224 8855
0.00036982275 10339 0.0003698225 9078 0.0003698224 8303 0.00036982258 7895
0.0003698225 8925 0.00036982258 9246 0.00036982258 8821 0.0003698224 10477
0.00036982243 9367 0.0003698224 8687 0.00036982258 8830 0.00036982243 8510
Table 7: Table illustrating the scores and add-on execution time for 100 malware
web pages, in four columns (i.e., 25 samples per column). Malware web pages are
morphed with 15000 lines of dead code.
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Table 8: Table illustrating the max and min scores for all the sample files, after
comparing the scores from the tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
Min Score Max Score
291 malware samples 0.000369822260 0.000369822750
9 exceptional malware samples 0.001423994000 0.001423994700
300 benign samples 0.001479288900 0.001479291400
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Table 9: Table contains scores and add-on execution time details for popular web
pages.
Web page Score Time (Milli seconds) Result
https://www.google.com/ 0.025195263 2189 Benign page
https://www.facebook.com/ 0.08652405 3190 Benign page
http://www.baidu.com/ 0.051652893 4442 Benign page
http://www.twitter.com/ 0.8132002 4076 Benign page
http://www.taobao.com 0.29001402 3401 Benign page
http://www.qq.com/ 0.014076417 3177 Benign page
https://www.linkedin.com 0.0916255 4309 Benign page
https://live.com 0.30142236 1379 Benign page
http://www.sina.com.cn/ 0.04421566 2513 Benign page
http://us.weibo.com/gb 0.210642001 2921 Benign page
http://www.hao123.com/ 0.046390533 5314 Benign page
http://www.bing.com/ 0.30142236 1323 Benign page
http://www.apple.com/ 0.0625 5505 Benign page
http://www.aliexpress.com/ 0.06497499 1794 Benign page
http://www.imdb.com/ 0.041259766 8022 Benign page
http://www.alibaba.com/ 0.0047562416 3206 Benign page
http://www.ask.com/ 0.051652893 4611 Benign page
https://www.netflix.com 0.0625 10046 Benign page
http://www.naver.com/ 0.30142236 2504 Benign page
http://diply.com/ 0.05702829 8612 Benign page
https://mail.google.com 0.30142236 1713 Benign page
http://www.youku.com/ 0.051652893 4044 Benign page
http://www.flipkart.com/ 0.018838914 1604 Benign page
https://www.amazon.com/ 0.100754 2839 Benign page
http://www.wikipedia.org/ 0.094681033 1914 Benign page
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Table 10: Splitting Transcriptase into several files
Count Min Max Count Min Max
1 3.70E-04 3.70E-04 20 1.68E-18 0.018838914
2 1.28E-18 1.16E-17 21 1.81E-17 0.018838914
3 1.77E-19 1.39E-17 22 1.69E-19 0.018838914
4 6.17E-19 1.75E-17 23 9.64E-20 0.018838914
5 4.41E-20 3.84E-04 24 7.37E-19 0.018838914
6 5.36E-18 0.00153787 26 1.61E-19 0.01883891
7 4.57E-19 3.84E-04 27 2.27E-17 0.018838914
8 2.19E-18 0.00153787 29 9.72E-19 0.018838914
9 1.86E-17 0.00153787 31 3.85E-18 0.018838914
10 1.69E-19 0.003460208 33 6.35E-18 0.018838914
11 1.73E-18 0.00615148 35 4.33E-18 0.018838914
12 3.91E-18 0.003460208 38 4.37E-18 0.018838914
13 5.64E-20 0.00615148 42 8.12E-18 0.018838914
14 5.47E-19 0.003460208 46 4.41E-20 0.018838914
15 1.88E-18 0.00615148 51 5.21E-18 0.018838914
16 8.01E-20 0.009611688 57 1.96E-17 0.018838914
17 1.26E-18 0.013840835 65 3.84E-04 0.024605926
18 5.07E-19 0.009611691 76 3.84E-04 0.024605926
19 8.01E-19 0.018838914
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Enhancements
The aim of this research was to build a Mozilla add-on to detect metamorphic
JavaScript malware embedded in a web page. For this purpose, I implemented an
add-on using the Mozilla add-on SDK. Internally, the add-on uses the Rhino
JavaScript engine to generate opcodes for the JavaScript content of a web page. As
the opcode graph similarity technique performs better while classifying the files with
similar opcode statistics, this technique was used in the add-on as a malware
detection technique. Test results from chapter 5 show that a threshold score value
0.00145 is able to classify the Transcriptase malware family viruses and benign web
pages properly even after adding significant amount of junk code. A similar
approach can be used for all the different types of metamorphic malware.
Test results also show that execution time for the add-on is around 1 to 4
seconds for benign web pages and 6 to 11 seconds for malware web pages. Even
though the execution overhead seems significant, the user is able to view the HTML
and CSS content of the page properly during the add-on execution period. As
discussed in Section 4.7.1, future enhancements for this thesis can include extending
the add-on to use the cloud to increase the add-on performance. This enhancement
requires efficient security measures, so that an intruder can’t eavesdrop/tamper with
the information passed to and from cloud.
Future enhancements also include eliminating the burden of validating some
external JavaScript files by storing their links as white lists. For instance, several
web pages may have JavaScript code to display Google Ads, as Google is secured
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and regularly monitored, we can safely consider all the external Google Ads related
JavaScript files as benign files. This approach may also involve some risk if any of
the web page in the white list is attacked.
Different malware detection techniques can be added to the add-on to increase
the detection rate. As discussed in Section 4.8, the add-on provides simple way to
include other detection techniques.
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APPENDIX
Code snippets
A.1 Python parser
Listing A.1: The parser code detects the valid start and end point of the JavaScript
functions and properly splits the Transcriptase code.
1 with open("transcriptase.js", "r") as ins:
2 total_functions = 1000
3 line = ins.read()
4 k = sys.argv[1]
5 required = (int)(total_functions/k)
6 cnt,braces,rbraces,sbraces,brackets_match,func_ind = 0,0,0,0,0,0
7 skip, eachfun_done = False, False
8 data, skip_char = ’’, ’’
9 function_start = True
10 func = [’f’,’u’,’n’,’c’,’t’,’i’,’o’,’n’]
11 for c in line:
12 if cnt == required and eachfun_done == True:
13 cnt = 0
14 eachfun_done = False
15 #write data into a file
16 data=’’
17 if (c==’\textquotedblleft’ or c=="\textquoteleft") and skip==False:
18 skip = True
19 data = data+c
20 skip_char = c
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21 continue
22 if skip == True:
23 data = data+c
24 if skip_char == c:
25 skip = False
26 skip_char = ’’
27 continue
28 if c == ’(’:
29 rbraces+=1
30 elif c == ’)’:
31 rbraces-=1
32 if c == ’[’:
33 sbraces+=1
34 elif c == ’]’:
35 sbraces-=1
36 if c == ’{’:
37 if function_start==True:
38 function_start=False
39 braces+=1
40 elif c == ’}’:
41 braces-=1
42 if braces == 0 and sbraces ==0 and rbraces == 0:
43 if function_start==False:
44 eachfun_done = True
45 else:
46 data = data +c
47 continue
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48 if func[func_ind] == c:
49 func_ind+=1
50 else:
51 func_ind=0
52 if func_ind == 8:
53 total_functions+=1
54 cnt+=1
55 function_start=True
56 eachfun_done = False
57 func_ind=0
58 data+=c
59 if data != "":
60 cnt = 0
61 eachfun_done = False
62 #write data into a file
63 data=’’
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